Code Details

Civil Code – CIV
DIVISION 1. PERSONS [38 – 86] ( Heading of Division 1 amended by Stats. 1988, Ch. 160, Sec. 12. )
PART 2. PERSONAL RIGHTS [43 – 53.7] ( Part 2 enacted 1872. )

Exact Statute Text

A privileged publication or broadcast is one made:

(a) In the proper discharge of an official duty.

(b) In any (1) legislative proceeding, (2) judicial proceeding, (3) in any other official proceeding authorized by law, or (4) in the initiation or course of any other proceeding authorized by law and reviewable pursuant to Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 1084) of Title 1 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, except as follows:

(1) An allegation or averment contained in any pleading or affidavit filed in an action for marital dissolution or legal separation made of or concerning a person by or against whom no affirmative relief is prayed in the action shall not be a privileged publication or broadcast as to the person making the allegation or averment within the meaning of this section unless the pleading is verified or affidavit sworn to, and is made without malice, by one having reasonable and probable cause for believing the truth of the allegation or averment and unless the allegation or averment is material and relevant to the issues in the action.

(2) This subdivision does not make privileged any communication made in furtherance of an act of intentional destruction or alteration of physical evidence undertaken for the purpose of depriving a party to litigation of the use of that evidence, whether or not the content of the communication is the subject of a subsequent publication or broadcast which is privileged pursuant to this section. As used in this paragraph, “physical evidence” means evidence specified in Section 250 of the Evidence Code or evidence that is property of any type specified in Chapter 14 (commencing with Section 2031.010) of Title 4 of Part 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(3) This subdivision does not make privileged any communication made in a judicial proceeding knowingly concealing the existence of an insurance policy or policies.

(4) A recorded lis pendens is not a privileged publication unless it identifies an action previously filed with a court of competent jurisdiction which affects the title or right of possession of real property, as authorized or required by law.

(5) This subdivision does not make privileged any communication between a person and a law enforcement agency in which the person makes a false report that another person has committed, or is in the act of committing, a criminal act or is engaged in an activity requiring law enforcement intervention, knowing that the report is false, or with reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of the report.

(c) In a communication, without malice, to a person interested therein, (1) by one who is also interested, or (2) by one who stands in such a relation to the person interested as to afford a reasonable ground for supposing the motive for the communication to be innocent, or (3) who is requested by the person interested to give the information. This subdivision applies to and includes a communication concerning the job performance or qualifications of an applicant for employment, based upon credible evidence, made without malice, by a current or former employer of the applicant to, and upon request of, one whom the employer reasonably believes is a prospective employer of the applicant. This subdivision applies to and includes a complaint of sexual harassment by an employee, without malice, to an employer based upon credible evidence and communications between the employer and interested persons, without malice, regarding a complaint of sexual harassment. This subdivision authorizes a current or former employer, or the employer’s agent, to answer, without malice, whether or not the employer would rehire a current or former employee and whether the decision to not rehire is based upon the employer’s determination that the former employee engaged in sexual harassment. This subdivision does not apply to a communication concerning the speech or activities of an applicant for employment if the speech or activities are constitutionally protected, or otherwise protected by Section 527.3 of the Code of Civil Procedure or any other provision of law.

(d) (1) By a fair and true report in, or a communication to, a public journal, of (A) a judicial, (B) legislative, or (C) other public official proceeding, or (D) of anything said in the course thereof, or (E) of a verified charge or complaint made by any person to a public official, upon which complaint a warrant has been issued.

(2) Paragraph (1) does not make privileged any communication to a public journal that does any of the following:

(A) Violates Rule 3.6 of the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct.

(B) Breaches a court order.

(C) Violates a requirement of confidentiality imposed by law.

(e) By a fair and true report of (1) the proceedings of a public meeting, if the meeting was lawfully convened for a lawful purpose and open to the public, or (2) the publication of the matter complained of was for the public benefit.

(Amended by Stats. 2023, Ch. 131, Sec. 9. (AB 1754) Effective January 1, 2024.)

Civil Code § 47 Summary

California Civil Code § 47 establishes various categories of “privileged publications or broadcasts.” In plain language, this means that certain statements made in specific contexts are protected by law, generally preventing them from forming the basis of a defamation lawsuit or similar civil claims, even if the statements are false.

The statute outlines several key areas where this privilege applies:

• Official Duties (a): Communications made by public officials while performing their proper governmental functions.
• Legal and Official Proceedings (b): Statements made in legislative, judicial, or other legally authorized official proceedings. This broad category covers most communications made in the course of litigation or government agency actions. However, it includes several critical exceptions:

* Malicious, unverified allegations in divorce/legal separation cases against non-parties.
* Communications made to destroy or alter physical evidence in litigation.
* Knowingly concealing an insurance policy in a judicial proceeding.
* Certain improperly recorded “lis pendens” (notice of pending lawsuit).
* False reports made to law enforcement with knowledge or reckless disregard of their falsity.

• Interested Persons (c): Communications made without malice between individuals who have a mutual interest in the subject matter, or where one person has a reasonable, innocent motive to share information, or is requested to do so. This specifically includes job performance references (without malice, based on credible evidence) and sexual harassment complaints made by an employee to an employer (without malice, based on credible evidence). It also allows employers to state, without malice, whether they would rehire an employee, especially if related to sexual harassment, but does not protect communications about constitutionally protected speech or activities of an applicant.
• Public Reports by Media (d): Fair and true reports by public journals (media) about judicial, legislative, or other public official proceedings, including what was said during them, or verified charges that led to a warrant. Exceptions apply if the communication violates professional conduct rules, court orders, or confidentiality laws.
• Public Meetings/Benefit (e): Fair and true reports of lawful public meetings, or publications made for the public benefit.

The statute aims to protect open communication essential for government functions, the justice system, and a free press, while also including important safeguards against abuse.

Purpose of Civil Code § 47

The primary purpose of California Civil Code § 47 is to foster free and open communication in specific contexts deemed essential for the functioning of society, without the chilling effect of potential defamation lawsuits. By granting privilege to certain publications and broadcasts, the legislature seeks to achieve several important objectives:

• Promote Effective Governance and Justice: The privilege for statements made in official duties and legal proceedings (subdivisions a and b) ensures that public officials, judges, legislators, lawyers, parties, and witnesses can speak freely and candidly without fear of civil liability. This allows for vigorous debate, advocacy, and truth-seeking, which are foundational to the legislative process, the administration of justice, and effective government. Without this protection, individuals might be hesitant to report crimes, testify truthfully, or engage in necessary legal discourse.
• Facilitate Honest Communication in Key Relationships: Subdivision (c) recognizes the importance of candid communication in certain private relationships, such as between employers and prospective employers, or between employees and employers regarding serious matters like sexual harassment. By protecting non-malicious communications based on credible evidence, the statute aims to encourage the sharing of truthful information that serves a legitimate interest, such as ensuring safe workplaces or making informed hiring decisions.
• Uphold a Free and Informed Press: Subdivisions (d) and (e) safeguard the media’s ability to report fairly and accurately on public proceedings and matters of public interest. This is crucial for an informed citizenry and for holding public institutions accountable. The privilege supports the constitutional right to freedom of the press by minimizing the risk of defamation claims stemming from the reporting of official public information.
• Balance Protection with Accountability: While broadly protecting speech, the various exceptions within the statute demonstrate a legislative intent to prevent abuse. These exceptions ensure that the privilege does not shield communications made with malicious intent, those that undermine the judicial process (like destroying evidence or concealing insurance), or those that involve false criminal reports made to law enforcement. This reflects a delicate balance between encouraging open communication and preventing its misuse for harmful or fraudulent purposes.

Real-World Example of Civil Code § 47

Imagine a personal injury lawsuit stemming from a car accident. The plaintiff alleges the defendant was driving recklessly.

Scenario 1 (Privileged Communication): During a deposition (a “judicial proceeding” under subdivision (b)), the plaintiff’s attorney questions a witness who saw the accident. The witness states under oath that the defendant was “swerving all over the road and looked like they were texting.” This statement, even if later proven to be partially inaccurate or an exaggeration, is privileged. The defendant cannot sue the witness for defamation based on this deposition testimony because it was made in the course of a judicial proceeding, in furtherance of the litigation, and is therefore protected by Civil Code § 47(b). This protection allows witnesses to provide their observations and opinions without fear of being sued, facilitating the discovery of facts in the legal process.

Scenario 2 (Exception to Privilege): Now, consider the exception under Civil Code § 47(b)(5) regarding false reports to law enforcement. Suppose, after the accident, the defendant, knowing it’s false, calls the police and reports that the plaintiff actually assaulted them after the crash, trying to deflect blame and create a counter-narrative. The defendant makes this report to law enforcement knowing it’s false, or with reckless disregard for its truth. Even though this communication is made to an official body, it would *not* be privileged under § 47(b)(5). If the plaintiff could prove the report was intentionally false or made with reckless disregard, they could potentially bring a claim against the defendant (e.g., for malicious prosecution or intentional infliction of emotional distress) that would not be barred by Civil Code § 47.

Related Statutes

Civil Code § 47 is a foundational statute, particularly when dealing with issues of speech and liability. It often interacts with, or serves as a defense against, claims arising from other California laws:

• Civil Code § 44 – Defamation (Libel and Slander): This statute defines what constitutes defamation. Civil Code § 47 acts as an affirmative defense to defamation claims, establishing that certain communications, even if defamatory, are immune from liability. These two statutes are inseparable in any defamation analysis.
• Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16 – Anti-SLAPP Statute: California’s anti-SLAPP (Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation) law allows defendants to quickly dismiss lawsuits that are primarily aimed at chilling their exercise of free speech or petition rights. Often, the “protected activity” element of an anti-SLAPP motion is established by demonstrating that the defendant’s conduct falls within one of the privileges enumerated in Civil Code § 47, especially the litigation privilege under § 47(b).
• Penal Code § 118 – Perjury: While Civil Code § 47 provides a civil privilege for statements made in judicial proceedings, it does not shield individuals from criminal liability for perjury (knowingly making false statements under oath). The privilege applies to civil claims like defamation, not to criminal offenses.
• Evidence Code § 250 – Physical Evidence: Referenced in Civil Code § 47(b)(2), this section broadly defines “physical evidence” in the context of the privilege exception for destruction or alteration of evidence, ensuring consistency in legal definitions.
• Code of Civil Procedure § 2031.010 et seq. – Discovery of Documents, Tangible Things, and Land or Other Property: Also referenced in Civil Code § 47(b)(2), this part of the Code of Civil Procedure outlines the procedures for obtaining physical evidence through discovery, reinforcing the importance of protecting evidence from destruction or alteration.
• Code of Civil Procedure § 1084 et seq. – Writs of Mandate: Cited in Civil Code § 47(b)(4), this chapter details the process for obtaining writs of mandate, which are often used to review official proceedings. The privilege extends to proceedings reviewable under these provisions, emphasizing the broad scope of protection for official government actions.
• Code of Civil Procedure § 527.3 – Injunctions in Labor Disputes: Referenced in Civil Code § 47(c), this statute protects certain speech and activities related to labor disputes from injunctions. Its mention in § 47(c) ensures that employment reference communications do not inadvertently chill constitutionally or statutorily protected employee speech or activity.
• California Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.6 – Trial Publicity: Civil Code § 47(d)(2)(A) specifically excludes from privilege any communication to a public journal that violates this State Bar rule. Rule 3.6 generally restricts what lawyers can say publicly about ongoing cases to prevent prejudice to the proceedings, highlighting the ethical obligations that limit media-related privilege.

Case Law Interpreting Civil Code § 47

Civil Code § 47, particularly the litigation privilege under subdivision (b), has been the subject of extensive judicial interpretation in California. Here are some key cases that have shaped its application:

• Silberg v. Anderson, 50 Cal.3d 205 (1990): This seminal California Supreme Court case established the broad reach of the litigation privilege, holding that it applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that has some connection or logical relation to the action.

* [Link to Silberg v. Anderson on Google Scholar](https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=13903173003004383180)

• Rusheen v. Rusheen, 37 Cal.4th 1048 (2006): The California Supreme Court clarified that the litigation privilege extends to the *publication* of privileged communications (e.g., enforcement of a judgment) but generally does not apply to “noncommunicative conduct.” It reaffirmed that the “furtherance of the objects of the litigation” element of the privilege is broadly construed.

* [Link to Rusheen v. Rusheen on Google Scholar](https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3437537636605051996)

• Flatley v. Mauro, 39 Cal.4th 299 (2006): This case is significant for its interplay with California’s anti-SLAPP statute (CCP § 425.16). The Supreme Court held that the litigation privilege can apply to pre-litigation communications, but also clarified that certain egregious conduct (like criminal extortion) is not protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute and thus not privileged, regardless of its connection to litigation.

* [Link to Flatley v. Mauro on Google Scholar](https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=16726880315758509121)

• Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd., 94 Cal.App.4th 506 (2001): This Court of Appeal case provided an in-depth discussion of the “official proceeding” privilege under subdivision (b), confirming its broad application to various quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings authorized by law, not just traditional courtrooms.

* [Link to Action Apartment Assn., Inc. v. Santa Monica Rent Control Bd. on Google Scholar](https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17604620015509745129)

• Liang v. Park West Landscape, Inc., 55 Cal.App.5th 615 (2020): This more recent Court of Appeal case illustrates the application of the subdivision (c) qualified privilege in the employment context, particularly concerning employer-employee communications about sexual harassment. It reinforced that the privilege requires the absence of malice and the presence of credible evidence for such communications.

* [Link to Liang v. Park West Landscape, Inc. on Google Scholar](https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=17565355695627685601)

Why Civil Code § 47 Matters in Personal Injury Litigation

Civil Code § 47 plays a critical role in California personal injury litigation, significantly impacting how cases are pursued, defended, and even initiated. Understanding this statute is essential for both plaintiffs and defendants, as well as their legal counsel.

• Protecting Core Legal Activities: In personal injury cases, parties, witnesses, and attorneys constantly engage in communication. From filing the initial complaint, to discovery (depositions, interrogatories), to presenting evidence and arguments in court, nearly all statements made within the scope of a judicial proceeding are protected by the absolute litigation privilege under § 47(b). This means a defendant cannot typically sue a plaintiff for “defamation” based on allegations made in a complaint, or a witness for their testimony, as long as those communications are related to the lawsuit. This freedom allows for vigorous advocacy and the full airing of facts and claims without fear of retaliatory lawsuits.
• Defense Against Ancillary Claims: The litigation privilege is a powerful shield against a wide array of secondary tort claims that might arise from statements made during litigation. Beyond defamation, it can bar claims like intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, or civil conspiracy, if those claims are based solely on privileged communications. This can significantly limit a plaintiff’s ability to “pile on” additional causes of action or a defendant’s ability to cross-complain.
• Strategic Impact on Evidence and Discovery: The exceptions to § 47(b) are particularly relevant. For instance, § 47(b)(2) explicitly states that communications made in furtherance of destroying or altering physical evidence are *not* privileged. This exception is vital in personal injury cases where spoliation of evidence can significantly hinder a plaintiff’s ability to prove their case. It ensures that discussions about hiding or tampering with key evidence (e.g., dashcam footage, medical records, vehicle parts) are not immune from legal scrutiny.
• Transparency of Insurance Information: The exception in § 47(b)(3) prevents parties from knowingly concealing the existence of an insurance policy in a judicial proceeding. In personal injury cases, insurance coverage is often paramount, determining the extent of a defendant’s financial responsibility. This exception promotes transparency and prevents deceptive practices that could undermine a plaintiff’s ability to recover damages.
• False Police Reports: Civil Code § 47(b)(5) makes it clear that making a false report to a law enforcement agency, knowing it’s false or with reckless disregard for its truth, is *not* privileged. If a party to a personal injury case makes a false report about the other party’s criminal conduct related to the incident, they could face separate civil liability, as the privilege will not protect them.
• Anti-SLAPP Considerations: Defendants in personal injury cases might sometimes face counter-claims or related lawsuits arising from their initial actions (e.g., reporting an accident to the police, testifying in court). If these subsequent lawsuits are deemed Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP), the defendant might invoke Civil Code § 47 as a basis for an anti-SLAPP motion (under CCP § 425.16), arguing that their communication was privileged and thus protected speech.
• Attorney-Client Advisement: Personal injury attorneys must be acutely aware of the boundaries of Civil Code § 47. They need to advise clients on what can be safely communicated within legal proceedings and what actions or statements (especially those falling under the exceptions) could expose them to additional liability. This ensures both robust advocacy and ethical conduct throughout the litigation process.