For plaintiff-side and defense-side lawyers alike, Privette remains one of the most consequential doctrines in California worksite litigation. It is also one of the most frequently overread. The defense often invokes Privette as though it were a categorical bar. The better view, reflected in the California Supreme Court’s more recent cases, is narrower and more disciplined: Privette is a delegation doctrine that limits hirer liability only where the predicate delegation showing is made and no exception or independent duty defeats the presumption. This guide is written for attorneys. It focuses on the doctrinal architecture of Privette, the procedural burdens on summary judgment, the threshold question of whether Privette applies at all, and the principal theories that continue to permit recovery notwithstanding Privette. It does not address any specific factual record.

I. The Modern Foundation of Privette

The starting point remains Privette v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 689, but modern analysis should begin with Gonzalez v. Mathis (2021) 12 Cal.5th 29 and Sandoval v. Qualcomm Inc. (2021) 12 Cal.5th 256. Those decisions make clear that the doctrine is now framed primarily in terms of delegation rather than workers’ compensation exclusivity. When a hirer delegates the contracted work to an independent contractor, the hirer ordinarily delegates responsibility for performing that work safely as well. (Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 270; Gonzalez, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 41.)

That framing matters. It means the critical inquiry is not simply whether the plaintiff was working as or for an independent contractor. The central question is whether the defendant is a hirer that actually occupies a place in a valid chain of delegation and whether the injury arises from the delegated work rather than from the hirer’s own conduct or an independent duty.

II. Summary Judgment: Start With the Predicate Showing

On summary judgment, counsel should resist any effort to treat Privette as self-executing. As Degala v. John Stewart Co. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 158 explains, the Privette presumption does not arise unless the moving defendant first establishes that it hired an independent contractor to perform certain work and that the plaintiff was an employee of that contractor injured in the course of that work. (Id. at pp. 166-167.) Only after that foundational showing does the burden of production shift to the opposing party to raise a triable issue regarding an exception. (Ibid.)

That point is often outcome-determinative. In many cases, the first and best response to a Privette motion is that the moving defendant has not established the chain of delegation at all. The defense still bears the burden of persuasion. It cannot simply point to evidentiary uncertainty and demand that the plaintiff disprove delegation. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854-855.

Practice point: Before briefing Hooker or Kinsman, ask whether the moving defendant has actually proved hirer status and a valid chain of delegation. In an appropriate record, that threshold issue can defeat the motion without ever reaching the exceptions.

III. Threshold Non-Applicability: No Hirer, No Privette

The most underused Privette argument is also the simplest: the doctrine does not apply where the  moving defendant did not hire the injured worker or the worker’s contractor, directly or indirectly.  Tverberg v. Fillner Construction, Inc. (2010) 49 Cal.4th 518 (Tverberg I), recognizes that  delegation may be direct or indirect, but it must still be delegation. (Id. at p. 528.) 

Ramirez v. PK I Plaza 580 SC LP (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 252 is the leading modern authority.  There, the Court of Appeal held that a property owner that did not hire the injured contractor and  did not delegate responsibility through the chain of delegation could not invoke Privette. (Id. at pp.  257-258, 265.) Gordon v. ARC Manufacturing, Inc. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 705 reaches the same  conclusion: where defendants did not hire the injured worker, the required delegation premise is  missing. (Id. at pp. 717-719.) 

For practitioners, this means discovery on hiring relationships is not housekeeping. It is core  Privette discovery. Contracts, subcontracts, purchase orders, staffing communications, vendor  invoices, and PMQ testimony on who retained whom often determine whether the doctrine ever  comes into play.

IV. Hooker: Retained Control Still Matters, But Sandoval Defines the Elements

The first major exception is the retained-control doctrine recognized in Hooker v. Department of  Transportation (2002) 27 Cal.4th 198. In modern briefing, however, Sandoval should do most of  the analytical work. Sandoval breaks the inquiry into three elements: retained control, actual  exercise, and affirmative contribution. (Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 271.)

Retained control 

A hirer retains control where it keeps a sufficient degree of authority over the manner of  performance of the entrusted work. (Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 274.) A generalized right to  inspect, coordinate, or stop work is not enough by itself. The retained authority must bear on how  the work is actually to be performed. 

Actual exercise 

Retained authority, standing alone, does not create liability. The hirer must actually exercise that  control by involving itself in the work such that the contractor is not entirely free to perform in its  own manner. (Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 276.) Sandoval makes clear that actual exercise may  occur through direction, participation, or induced reliance. 

Affirmative contribution 

The hirer’s exercise of retained control must affirmatively contribute to the injury. (Sandoval,  supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 277.) That contribution need not be an affirmative act in the ordinary sense.  The hirer’s negligence may consist of an act, a course of conduct, or a failure to take a reasonable  precaution, provided the omission falls within the scope of the hirer’s Hooker duty. (Id. at p. 276.)  What remains insufficient is the passive permitting of an unsafe condition to occur. (Tverberg v.  Fillner Construction Co. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1439, 1448 (Tverberg II).) 

Recent plaintiff-side briefing often benefits from pairing Sandoval with Degala. Degala demonstrates how coordinated decisions about site security, access, fencing, sequencing, and  worksite configuration can amount to actual exercise of retained control where they constrain the  contractor’s freedom to perform the work in its own manner. (Degala, supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at pp.  169-170.) 

V. Kinsman: Concealed Hazard as a Distinct Premises Theory

The second principal exception is the concealed-hazard rule recognized in Kinsman v. Unocal Corp. (2005) 37 Cal.4th 659. Where the hirer is also a landowner or possessor of land, liability may arise  if the hirer knew or should have known of a concealed preexisting hazard, the contractor did not  know and could not reasonably have discovered it, and the hirer failed to warn. (Id. at pp. 674-675.) 

Kinsman is analytically distinct from Hooker. It is not about control over the manner of the work; it  is about the landowner-hirer’s superior knowledge of a concealed premises condition. This makes  Kinsman especially important in industrial, utility, demolition, environmental, and roof-access cases  where the danger is latent, technical, or historically embedded in the site itself. Rowland v.  Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 remains useful as the broader premises-duty backdrop.

VI. Privette Does Not Eliminate Claims Based on the Hirer’s Own Independent Negligence

Some of the most effective anti-Privette arguments are not framed as exceptions at all. They are  framed as ordinary negligence claims based on duties that exist independently of the contracted  work. Browne v. Turner Construction Co. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1334 explains that Privette does  

not insulate a hirer from liability for its own breach of duties arising under general tort principles,  including duties created by the hirer’s own voluntary undertaking to protect workers or others from  injury. (Id. at pp. 1345-1347.) 

Ray v. Silverado Constructors (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1120 is equally important because it  recognizes duties that exist independently of the worker’s contracted task. Ray teaches that when  the defendant owes a broader duty to the general public or to a class of persons that includes the  injured worker, Privette does not necessarily foreclose the claim merely because the plaintiff  happened to be working at the site. (Id. at pp. 1128-1136.) 

One of the more useful observations from Sandoval is that a hirer’s authority over noncontract work  can give rise to tort duties distinct from retained-control duties. (Sandoval, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp.  274-275.) That language is particularly valuable in cases where the hirer’s negligence concerns  traffic control, site access, public interfaces, premises configuration, or safety measures that fall  outside the plaintiff’s own delegated scope of work.

VII. Nondelegable Regulatory Duties: Barclay, Evard, and the Limits of SeaBright

Where the plaintiff can tie the hirer’s conduct to a specific statutory or regulatory safety obligation,  Barclay v. Jesse M. Lange Distributor, Inc. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 281 offers a powerful  framework. Barclay holds that a hirer may face liability for breaching a nondelegable duty imposed  by safety regulations, and that affirmative contribution can be established by omission as well as by  active conduct. (Id. at pp. 295, 301.) Evard v. Southern California Edison (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th  137 likewise recognizes a triable issue where the hirer failed to comply with applicable safety  regulations. (Id. at p. 148.) 

Defense counsel will usually respond with SeaBright Ins. Co. v. U.S. Airways, Inc. (2011) 52  Cal.4th 590. That response must be handled carefully. SeaBright remains significant for the  proposition that certain workplace-safety duties, particularly in the Cal-OSHA context, may be  delegated to the contractor. (Id. at p. 601.) But SeaBright does not erase every regulatory theory.  The better practice is to identify the source and purpose of the regulation at issue, distinguish duties  imposed for the protection of the general public from those tied solely to the contractor’s workplace  methods, and analyze whether the duty is truly delegable under the particular statutory scheme. 

Delgadillo v. Television Center, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1078 should also be part of this  discussion because it reinforces the reluctance of courts to extend nondelegable-duty theories too  broadly in the Cal-OSHA setting. (Id. at p. 1090.)

VIII. Public Franchise or Permit-Based Duties: Vargas and Beyond

Another underused line of authority appears in Vargas v. FMI, Inc. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 638.  Vargas relies on Restatement Second of Torts section 428 and holds that where the defendant  operates under a public franchise or similar governmental authorization carrying a nondelegable  obligation to protect the public, Privette does not bar liability. (Id. at pp. 641, 649-653.) 

Vargas is especially useful in cases involving public-right-of-way work, transportation, licensed  carriers, or regulated activity that can be undertaken only by virtue of governmental permission.  The core insight is that some duties arise not from the contract for the plaintiff’s work, but from the  defendant’s acceptance of public authorization conditioned on public safety obligations.

IX. Municipal Codes, Permit Conditions, and Standards as Evidence of Duty and Standard of Care

Even where no private right of action exists under a municipal code or permit provision, the  regulatory framework may still be highly relevant to duty, breach, and standard of care. Safety  provisions can be used not as standalone claims, but as evidence of the scope of the defendant’s  assumed responsibilities and the governing standard of care. 

Two authorities are worth keeping in this part of the toolkit. First, Elsner v. Uveges (2004) 34  Cal.4th 915 confirms that safety regulations may be admissible to establish the standard of care. (Id.  at pp. 927-928.) Second, Lorenzo v. Calex Engineering, Inc. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 49 is useful as  a recent example of a court considering permit conditions in evaluating duty.

X. Litigation Framework for Attorneys Opposing a Privette Motion

In practice, Privette motion work is most effective when organized in layers rather than in a single  all-or-nothing response. 

• Layer one: challenge the predicate showing. Has the moving defendant actually proved  hirer status and a valid chain of delegation? 
• Layer two: analyze retained control under Hooker and Sandoval. Separate retained  authority, actual exercise, and affirmative contribution. 
• Layer three: evaluate concealed-hazard theories under Kinsman. 
• Layer four: identify duties independent of the contracted work under Browne, Ray, and the  noncontract-work discussion in Sandoval.
• Layer five: assess whether specific regulatory, code-based, franchise-based, or permit-based  obligations support a nondelegable-duty theory under Barclay, Evard, or Vargas.

This layered structure is valuable because it prevents the defense from collapsing every issue into a  single abstract statement that Privette bars the claim. Often the real fight is not over whether  Privette exists, but over whether the facts and duties at issue fall within its boundary at all. 

XI. A Practical Case Matrix

• Threshold non-applicability: Tverberg I, Ramirez, Gordon. 
• Retained control: Hooker, Sandoval, Tverberg II, Degala. 
• Concealed premises hazard: Kinsman, with Rowland as general premises backdrop. 
• Independent negligence / own conduct: Browne, Ray, and the noncontract-work language  in Sandoval. 
• Regulatory nondelegable duty: Barclay, Evard, with careful attention to the reach of  SeaBright and Delgadillo. 
• Public franchise or public-authorization duty: Vargas. 

• Use of regulations and permit conditions to establish standard of care: Elsner and  Lorenzo.

XII. Conclusion

Privette remains a formidable doctrine, but it is not a universal solvent for worksite liability.  Properly understood, it is a rebuttable delegation-based limitation on hirer liability. The first  question is always whether the defendant has earned the presumption. The next questions are  

whether the hirer retained and exercised control, failed to warn of a concealed hazard, breached an  independent duty, or violated a nondelegable obligation arising from regulation, franchise, permit,  or public authorization. 

For attorneys handling these cases, the doctrine rewards precision. The best briefing does not argue  in slogans. It identifies the source of the asserted duty, the scope of the delegation, the nature of the  hirer’s own conduct, and the doctrinal lane that keeps the case outside Privette’s bar. 

This guide is for informational purposes only and is intended as a general attorney resource. It is not  legal advice and does not address the facts of any specific case.